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Being You: A New Science of Consciousness coming September 2021, Faber/Penguin

philosophy



perception





A $s \in \{s^{pos}, s^{neg}\}$ $o \in \{o^{pos}, o^{neg}\}$ $u \in \{u^{run}, u^{tumble}\}$ $a \in \{a^{run}, a^{tumble}\}$

machine learning



Tschantz et al (2020) PLoS Computational Biology Barnett et al (2020) Neuroimage Suzuki et al (2017) Scientific Reports Hohwy & Seth (2020) Philosophy and the Mind Sciences

why we do we make the choices that we make?

(what on Earth is 'free will'?)

predictably irrational

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The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions



Ariely (2008)

predictably irrational

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The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions



Ariely (2008)

predictably irrational

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The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions



Ariely (2008)

perceptual relativity



Ebbinghaus Illusion

perceptual relativity



Michael Bach (2018)

how things seem is not how they are







prediction

prediction error



Edward H. Adelson (1995)

not: I'll believe it when I see it

but: I'll see it when I believe it









Movie (c) Mehring lab, University of Freiburg, 2009 Botvinick & Cohen (1998) Nature

What's up with the rubber hand illusion?

POSTED ON NOVEMBER 9, 2020 BY AKSETH

Anil Seth, Warrick Roseboom, Zoltán Dienes, and Peter Lush University of Sussex, Brighton, UK



he rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a cornerstone of the scientific literature on embodiment. We have recently published a series of studies investigating the RHI, in particular its relationship to hypnotic (imaginative) suggestibility, and the validity of commonly used control conditions. These studies have generated substantial discussion regarding our claims, how they should be interpreted, and what all this means for past and future experimental studies of embodiment experiences. To clarify these issues, here we first summarise our main points (there is of course much more in the papers) and then provide responses to some frequently asked questions.



Recent Posts

What's up with the rubber hand illusion? November 9, 2020

Stepping up June 9, 2020

Registered Reports now available in Neuroscience of Consciousness April 26, 2019

Intentional binding without intentional action: A new take on an old idea April 26, 2019

Guest blog: Phenomenological control: Response to imaginative suggestion predicts measures of mirror touch synaesthesia, vicarious pain, and the rubber hand illusion April 19, 2019

Taking back control March 14, 2019

https://neurobanter.com/2020/11/09/whats-up-with-the-rubber-hand-illusion/

nature

ARTICLE

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-18591-6 OPEN

Trait phenomenological control predicts experience of mirror synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion

Check for updates

P. Lush 😳 ^{1,2} 🖾, V. Botan^{1,3}, R. B. Scott^{1,3}, A. K. Seth 😳 ^{1,2,4}, J. Ward^{1,3} & Z. Dienes^{1,3}

In hypnotic responding, expectancies arising from imaginative suggestion drive striking experiential changes (e.g., hallucinations) — which are experienced as involuntary — according to a normally distributed and stable trait ability (hypnotisability). Such experiences can be triggered by implicit suggestion and occur outside the hypnotic context. In large sample studies (of 156, 404 and 353 participants), we report substantial relationships between hypnotisability and experimental measures of experiential change in mirror-sensory synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion comparable to relationships between hypnotisability and individual hypnosis scale items. The control of phenomenology to meet expectancies arising from perceived task requirements can account for experiential change in psychological experiments.

Lush et al (2020) Nature Communications Seth et al (2020) Neurobanter

voluntary action



how things seem is not how they are

the Libet studies



Libet et al (1983) Brain

the Libet studies

- does the conscious 'urge' cause the voluntary action?
- does the readiness potential cause both?
- if so, what place could there be for 'free will'?
- (maybe there could still be 'free won't'?)
- the experience of volition is a special kind of perception

what do voluntary actions feel like?

- feeling of being aligned with beliefs, values, and goals (which I cannot choose)
- feeling that 'I could have done otherwise'
- feeling of being caused 'from within'





Haggard et al (2008) Nat Neuro Rev

the experience of 'free will'

- the experience of free will is the perception of the looping operation of this network
- experiences of 'free will' do not cause things to happen
- experiences of 'free will' are perceptions of the causes of voluntary actions
- just as the content of a visual experience might be 'red', the content of a 'free will' experience might be 'I caused something to happen'
- ... and just as 'red' doesn't really exist, neither does 'free will'





CPP (µV/m²) 200 400 800 -600 -400 600 -800 -200 0 0 _ Α % Coherence Report: Report: 'Left' 'Right'

> Kelly & O'Connell (2013) J Neurosci Seth (2021) Being You

Schurger et al (2012) Proc Nat Acad Sci USA

-1.5

volition



С

50

40

30

20 10

perception





Johansen et al (2005) Science



active movements



Physical events Physical events Judgement of action alone Judgement of tone alone Voluntary action + tone

intentional binding



Fig. 3. Interval-duration judgments in Experiment 1 (n = 48). The average reported duration of each interval (a) is shown for each actual interval duration and condition. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The average reported duration across the three intervals (b) is shown for each condition. In each box-and-whisker plot, the central horizontal line indicates the median, and the bottom and top edges indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively. Whiskers extend 1.5 times the interquartile range from the 25th and 75th percentiles. Individual data points are plotted as circles.

Suzuki et al (2019) Psychological Science

passive movements

free will is for the future

- if experiences of 'free will' do not cause things to happen, what is the point of having them?
- experiences of volition are the brain's way of keeping track of those actions that are caused largely from within
- (and their consequences)
- this is useful for learning
- the utility of feeling 'I could have done otherwise' is that next time, you might

experiences of free will help us learn

is 'free will' an illusion?

- yes
- there is no spooky soul-powered 'uncaused cause', no Cartesian residue of immaterial rationality





Daniel Wegner (2002)

is 'free will' an illusion?

- no
- the ability to perform voluntary actions (and learn from their outcomes) is very real indeed



alien hand syndrome



Charles Whitman

responsibility and reward

- western law assigns blame based \bigcirc on actus rea (guilty action) and mens rea (guilty mind)
- we don't choose to have the \bigcirc brains that we have



THE SATURDAY EVENING POST

iaw, whose stability or permanence is not as-sailed somewhere? Can there be any permanent value or any absolute truth in a world in which the three angles of the triangle have ceased to be equal to two right riangles—in a world in which time itself has lost its meaning, in which in-finity becomes finite, and the finite is lost in the infinite? Einstein refuse

ustification from his wn assault upon the ertainties of mathemat-s. His voice was bell-be and methy but hit

chievously topsy-turvy." I now remembered that some said that rs ago, when I first met Einstein in New York, he had relativity.

yeas ago, when 1 inst met Einstein emphatically resided the suggestion that he was a philosopher. "I am," he said, "solely a physicist." In spite of these denials, Einstein stands in a symbolic relation to our age-an age characterized by a revolt against the absolute in every sphere of science and of thought. He is a child of his are even if he excheme hild of his age even if he eschews

A Born Teacher

LIKE Napoleon, like Mussolin Albert Einstein has the distin tion of having become an almost legendary figure in his own lifetime. No man since Copernicus, Galileo and Newton has wrought more funmental changes in our attitude oward the universe. Einstein's universe is finite. Seen through Ein tein's eyes, space and time are a ost interchangeable terms. Time ppears caparisoned as a fourth di sion. Space, once undefinabl is assumed the shape of a spher s assumed the shape of a sphere, nstein taught us that light travels curves. All these facts are de-cted from the theory of relativity vanced by Einstein in 1915.

The World Famous Physicist and Me blem to His Secretary While Dictating to Her and gentle, but his words were decisive when he With the advent of Einstein, mathematics ceased to be volved the subject in his mind ice the rash application of the term an exact science in the fashion of Euclid. The new mathe-

as the fantastic network of a dr



work of a dream. "How can 1 form at least a dim idea of the fourth dimension?" "Imagine," Einstein replied, workty including the head with the dimension of the state of the state in two-dimensional space—for in-stance, the painting of a man re-clining on a bench. A tree stands beside the bench. Then imagine that the man walks from the bench that the man walks from the bench. He cannot reach the rock except by walking either in fromt of or behind walking either in front of or behin the tree. This is impossible in two dimensional space. He can read limensional space. He can reac the rock only by an excursion int

after page with the does not refer to a tex book: he works out suc formulas immediately himself. Often the for-

mula thus obtained

clearer, more compre hensible and more per lect than the equ that is found in books of

Time in Space

RECENTLY someo talked to him abo

color photography. Ein stein immediately re

"Now imagine another man sit-ting on the bench. How did he get there? Since two bodies cannot oc-cupy the same place at the same time, he can have got there only be-fore or after the first man moved. He must have moved in time. Time is the fourth dimension. In a simi-lar manner it is possible to explain five six and more dimensions. Many five, six and m problems of may fied by assuming the existence of Continued on Page 110

et view courses, 195. for Einstein Accompanying Mrs. Einstein's Piano Song With His Violin

Saturday Evening Post (1929)

implications

it's not all about rationality



voluntary actions have many causes

- voluntary actions are shaped by
 - intentions
 - emotions
 - other people



Phineas Gage Caspar et al (2020) Nature Communications



summary

summary

- 'spooky' free will doesn't exist,
- but voluntary actions are real
- experiences of free will do not cause voluntary actions ...
- ... they are perceptions of the causes of these actions,
- and they are essential for learning (so that we might do better the next time)
- cultivating peoples' experiences of intention and agency over their actions may help them learn to do better – when flexibility and innovation are required

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BEING YOU

Anil Seth's quest to understand the biological basis of conscious experience is one of the most exciting contributions to twenty-first-century science.

Seth's work has yielded new ways to communicate with patients previously deemed unconscious, as well as promising methods of coping with brain damage and disease. *Being You* sheds light on the future of AI and virtual/augmented reality, adds empirical evidence to cutting-edge ideas of how the brain works, and ushers in a new age in the study of the mystery of human consciousness. This book is a life-changing existential insight into being you—or being someone else.



Anil Seth is professor of cognitive and computational neuroscience at the University of Sussex, and co-director of the Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science.

AnilSeth.com

On sale 9/8/20 • ISBN 9781524742874 • \$28.00 (\$37.00 CAN)











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"She bent her finger and then straightened it. The mystery was in the instant before it moved, the dividing moment between not moving and moving, when her intention took effect. If she could only find herself at the crest, she thought, she might find the secret of herself, that part of her that was really in charge"





Ian McEwan (2000) Atonement

outline

- perception as inference
- the problem of voluntary action
- voluntary action as a special kind of perception
- 'free will' is for the future
- why we make the choices we make

group decision making

- when decisions are made by groups, people's opinions are 'weighted' by the confidence with which they are expressed
- but people differ in how confident they are, for a given level of accuracy
- so how to reach the optimal consensus?
- evidence indicates that people engage in confidence matching



Bang et al (2017) Nature Human Behavior